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Abstract—Transfer learning — transferring learned knowledge
— has brought a paradigm shift in the way models are trained.
The lucrative benefits of improved accuracy and reduced training
time have shown promise in training models with constrained
computational resources and fewer training samples. Specifically,
publicly available text-based models such as GloVe and BERT
that are trained on large corpus of datasets have seen ubiquitous
adoption in practice. However, the risks involved in using these
public models for various downstream tasks are yet unknown.
In this paper, we ask, “can transfer learning in text prediction
models be exploited to perform misclassification attacks?”
As our main contribution, we present novel attack techniques
that utilize unintended features learnt in the teacher (public)
model to generate adversarial examples for student (downstream)
models. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work
to show that transfer learning from state-of-the-art word-based
(e.g., GloVe) and sentence-based (e.g., BERT) teacher models
increase the susceptibility of student models to misclassification
attacks. First, we propose a novel word-score based attack
algorithm for generating adversarial examples against student
models trained using context-free word-level embedding model.
On binary classification tasks trained using the GloVe teacher
model, we achieve an average attack accuracy of 97% for the
IMDB Movie Reviews and 80% for the Fake News Detection. For
multi-class tasks, we divide the Newsgroup dataset into 6 and 20
classes and achieve an average attack accuracy of 75% and 41%
respectively. Next, we present length-based and sentence-based
misclassification attacks for the Fake News Detection task trained
using a context-aware BERT model and achieve 78% and 39%
attack accuracy respectively. Finally, we observe that existing
defenses such as fine-tuning, dropouts and adversarial training
fail to mitigate our attacks. Thus, our results motivate the need
for designing training techniques that are robust to unintended
feature learning, specifically for transfer learned models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Transfer learning techniques use teacher models pre-trained
on large datasets to train student models for downstream
tasks that have smaller amount of data. The idea is to share
or transfer the parameters learned in the teacher model and
directly use them while training the student model. This
avoids training the student model from scratch, i.e., random
initialization of parameters, thereby achieving better model
accuracy and reduced training time. This has resulted in
transfer learned models being deployed in a variety of different
applications [11], [12], [32] and enabled applications that
were not possible before [8], [33]. To promote transfer learn-
ing for text prediction tasks, state-of-the-art text embedding
models like Global Vectors (GloVe) [23] and Bidirectional
Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) [6] are
made publicly available. These models are supported even
in popular machine learning frameworks like PyTorch and
Tensorflow [3], [22]. Often, a single teacher model, that has
learned generic features of text data, is used for training
numerous downstream text prediction tasks. However, the risks
involved with such transferring of parameters and re-using
features across different models are unknown. We explore
this problem with regards to adversarial examples for transfer
learned text-based classification models.
Adversarial examples are designed to fool a classifier into
misclassifying them to a specific target class. Prior work on
adversarial attacks for text-based classifiers consider either a
completely white-box [15], [16], [17] or a black box model [4],
[7]. However, there has been less or no effort in analyzing
the risks of transfer learning for text data, that provides
a part white-box (teacher) and a part black-box (student)
setting. Recently, researchers have shown misclassification
attacks against transfer learned models, but those are limited
to only image classification tasks [26], [28], [30]. Existing
techniques such as optimizing the input space to find adver-
sarial examples, that work well with images, are ineffective
in the text domain due its discrete nature [21], [24]. In this
paper, we ask, “can transfer learning in text prediction models
be exploited to perform misclassification attacks?” Our key
insight is to leverage unintended features of inputs to craft
adversarial examples that get misclassified to a specific output
class. Unintended features are not necessarily related to the
prediction task but are unintentionally learned and used by
the student model, as an artifact of tranfer learning from the
teacher model or a bias in the training dataset. For example,
“length” of an article becomes an unintended feature when
used for the detection of fake news.
Our Approach. To perform misclassification attacks, it is
crucial to identify the classification boundary of the output
classes in the input feature space. Once this boundary is
known, an adversary can carefully craft inputs that belong
to one class but cross the boundary in the feature space
and get misclassified to a target class. We propose efficient
ways to accurately identify these classification boundaries with
restricted access to the student model and no access to its
training dataset. The use of transfer learning opens up a unique
threat model where the teacher part of the model is white-box
while the rest (student) is black-box, we call it the grey-box
setting. With limited queries to the student model accompanied
with unlimited access to the public teacher model, we identify
nearly accurate classification boundaries in the feature space.
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We use this boundary as a proxy for the student model and
craft adversarial examples in an efficient manner. We present
concrete adversarial attacks for transfer learning from two
types of text embedding models — word-level embedding and
sentence-level embedding models.
The word-based embedding model gives a vector represen-
tation of words which captures their syntactic and semantic
structure. Our attack on this model leverages the phenomenon
that the prediction probability of a particular class depends
on the presence or absence of certain (unintended) features
(or words) in the input. Although this phenomenon has been
implicitly observed in prior work [4], [15], we give a novel
and precise scoring mechanism that accurately quantifies the
importance of each word towards the prediction of a particular
class. To restrict the access to the student model, we train a
shadow model that predicts the score of each word for the
tasks of the student model. Thus, in our attack, the number of
queries to the student model are independent of the number of
adversarial examples to be generated. In contrast, prior work
on non-transfer learned models require queries proportional
to the number of words in each adversarial input [4], [16].
We combine the word-scores with the knowledge of the
teacher embedding model to construct highly effective tar-
geted adversarial examples. Our adversarial examples preserve
semantic correctness, require minimal perturbation and hence
are indistinguishable to humans. The drawback of the word-
embedding models is that they do not take the context of the
sentence into account. Therefore, we consider a context-aware
sentence-based embedding model that represents the entire
sentence while capturing its context to a vector. With regards to
this model, we present two types of attacks 1) length-based and
2) sentence-based misclassification attacks. For these attacks,
we use the length and the presence of specific sentences as
unintended features to identify the classification boundary in
the student model. Our novel and unconventional approach of
using unintended features to create adversarial examples make
our attacks robust to existing trivial defenses such as spell-
check, grammar check and even more advanced training time
defenses such as fine-tuning, dropout or adversarial training.
Results. We evaluate our attacks on transfer learned mod-
els using state-of-the-art word-based embedding, GloVe
model [23], and sentence-based embedding, BERT model [6].
For the GloVe based transfer learning, we perform concrete
attacks on two binary classification tasks Movie Reviews [18]
and Fake News Detection [19], and a multi-class model for
the Newsgroup dataset [14] divided into 6 and 20 classes. On
the binary classification tasks, we achieve an average attack
accuracy of 97% and 80% respectively. Our attacks outperform
prior work on adversarial examples for non-transfer learned
models on these datasets [15], [16], [17], [4], [7]. This shows
that transfer learning a student model from a public
teacher model increases its susceptibility to misclassifica-
tion attacks. On multi-class models, we observe an average
misclassification accuracy of 75% for 6 classes and 41% for 20
classes. Thus, performing targeted misclassification attacks
become difficult with increase in the number of output
classes. For transfer learning with BERT model, our length-
based attack on the Fake News Detection model misclassifies
78% of the real news to fake just by reducing the length
of the text. Our sentence-based adversarial examples reduce
the detection of fake news by 39%. This indicates that even
high-capacity context-aware teacher models like BERT are
susceptible to misclassification attacks using unintended
features. Our attacks are equally effective on models trained
with known defenses such as fine-tuning the teacher model,
adding dropout and adversarial training. The robustness to
existing defenses is expected as our attacks rely on the
unintended features that the model learns to predict output
classes. Hence, mitigating our attacks require techniques
that prevent the model from using unintended features
for prediction. However, we speculate that enforcing such
constraints might degrade the accuracy of the model which is
not acceptable in practice.
Contributions Our contribution are as follows:
• New Attack Techniques. We propose novel attack techniques
to generate adversarial examples based on unintended fea-
tures for the transfer learning setting. We present a word-
score based attack for the word-level embedding model
while a length-based, and a sentence-based attack for the
sentence-level embedding model. Our attacks require only a
few queries to the victim model to identify the unintended
features but require no access during the actual online attack.
• Efficacy of Attacks. Our adversarial examples are effective
with respect to the misclassification accuracy and efficient
with regards to the time required for generating them. Our
experiments on state-of-the-art GloVe and BERT models
used for training 3 different downstream tasks exhibit attack
accuracy ranging from 97% to 39% depending on the
number of output classes and the type of the teacher model.
• Robustness to Defenses. Our attacks are robust to trivial
defenses such as spell-check, grammar check as well as ad-
vanced defenses such as dropout, fine-tuning and adversarial
training. Defending our attacks require the transfer learned
models to be robust to unintended features in the input data.
II. PROBLEM & BACKGROUND
Our main goal is to understand the susceptibility of transfer
learned models towards different misclassification attacks.
We first discuss the motivation for transfer learning and the
types of teacher and student models for training text-based
classifiers. Next, we describe the threat model that arises due
to transferring of parameters from teacher to student models.
A. Text-based Prediction with Transfer Learning
We consider websites or plug-ins that host text classification
models such as a neural-network based fake news detector
or an ad-blocker [1], [2]. We assume that these models are
transfer learned from a publicly available teacher model.
Teacher models are usually made public by researchers or
industries to benefit the community [6], [23]. Often, there
are fewer teacher models on which several applications build
Fig. 1: Transfer Learning process for text-based classification.
their student models. The main idea is that the teacher model
learns some common features essential for predicting various
other tasks as well. Depending on the similarity of the target
task to the original task, the teacher model is used as follows:
• Feature Extractor - The features extracted or the parameters
learnt in the teacher model are directly used or copied as
the initial K out of N layers in the student model. The
weights of these K layers are fixed (frozen) and are not
updated while training the student model. The ratio of K
to N determines a deep-layer feature extractor if the ratio
is high or a mid-layer feature extractor in case of a lower
ratio. A deep-layered feature extractor is more effective if
the student task is similar to the teacher task.
• Fine Tuned - In this case, the parameters copied from
the teacher model are retrained or fine-tuned with a small
learning rate while training the student model. Fine-tuning
the full model requires more training time, however, it is
helpful if the student model’s objective is different than the
original task of the teacher model.
Figure 1 shows the process of transfer learning in text
prediction models. For text-based models, the teacher models
are often called language embedding models as they capture
the features in the text data and embed them as vector repre-
sentations. The initial layer in the student model is initialized
using these embedding models and used as a feature extractor
or fine-tuned during the training process. There are several
teacher models available for text data that provide embedding
vectors at the level of characters, words or sentences.
Types of Teacher Models. We consider the commonly used
word-level embedding and sentence-level embedding which
have shown to improve the accuracy of the student models.
We describe both these types below:
• Word-level Embedding: Word-level embedding uses unsu-
pervised learning to train the teacher model. It maps words
to vectors such that these vectors preserve the semantic
similarity of the words. Thus, the embedding of similar
meaning words have low distance between them. However,
these are context-free models, i.e., each word has a single
vector mapped to it irrespective of the context in which it
appears for e.g., the word “orange” will have the same vector
embedding whether it is used as a fruit or the color. GloVe
is a popular word-based embedding model [23].
• Sentence-level Embedding: For these models, the context of
the input sentence is considered while training the teacher
model. For example, the sentence “I like to eat orange”
specifies the context of orange to make it clear that we
are referring to a fruit. Hence, sentence-level representation
performs better than word-level representation. However,
they are bulkier, containing millions of parameters to train,
making the student model also heavy-weighted. BERT is a
state-of-the-art sentence embedding that uses a deep bidi-
rectional transformer encoder to represent the sentence [6].
Layers in the Student Model. We discuss the layers in the
student model that follow the two types of embedding models.
• LSTMs: Long short-term memory (LSTM) model are pop-
ular for learning sequence of inputs that have temporal
relations between them [10]. LSTMs have been widely used
in text, speech, audio, and video processing tasks because
of its property of remembering patterns for long durations
of time. Since word-level embedding model only represents
the words, the LSTM layer captures the relationship between
the words to perform the text classification task.
• Linear: Linear layers are the most simple neural networks
with few parameters. They take only fixed-length inputs,
making them unsuitable for texts. However, since sentence-
level embedding already captures all the contextual informa-
tion of sentences to a fixed-length vector, the linear layer is
appropriate to use after the sentence-level embedding layer.
B. Threat Model
We consider a passive attacker that has white-box access to
the public teacher model but black-box access to the student
model. We call this the grey-box setting. The attacker has no
access to the training dataset or the student model parameters
during or after the training, and hence cannot modify the
victim student model. We consider the attacker knows the
type of teacher model used i.e., word-level or sentence-level
embedding but has no knowledge about the type of layers
(LSTMs, Linear) or parameters in the student model.
The adversary can pose as a genuine user of the application
and query the student model to observe the probability distri-
bution of the output classes for any input query. However,
we assume the application has some limit on the number
of queries to the model or charges the user per query. The
attacker can create their own text inputs and submit them to
the application. The input text can use any valid English word
and printable characters. There is no restriction on the size
of the input text or the sentence structure. We consider this
attack setting to be realistic for any messaging system or social
platforms. The goal of the attacker is to misclassify certain
inputs to a desired target class. For example, the adversary
might want all the fake news reports to get predicted as
real news. We consider targeted attacks in this paper i.e.,
misclassify an input to a specific target class as those attacks
are highly incentivized as compared to randomized attacks
where inputs are misclassified to any of the output classes.
C. Problem Statement: Misclassification Attacks
Our goal is to design attack algorithms to generate inputs
such that they are misclassified to a desired target class. Before
we state our problem of misclassification attack, we describe
the classification procedure in transfer learned models.
Classification with transfer learning. Let us consider a text
binary classification task, without loss of generality, consisting
of input-label pairs (x, y) ∈ A×{+1,−1} from a distribution
D. The objective is to learn a classifier C :→ {+1,−1}, that
takes an input text x drawn from a distribution representing
all valid string inputs A (x ∼ A) and maps it to a label y ∈
{+1,−1}. A feature extractor is defined as a function f that
takes a input x from A and maps it to an n-dimensional vector
Rn, F : A → Rn. Then, (fw, fs) ∈ F where fw and fs are
word-level and sentence-level feature extractors respectively.
A student model thus can be defined as C = (f, w, b) where
w is a weight vector and b is a bias value. Thus for an input
x, the classifier will then make a prediction based on the dot
product between feature f(x) and model weight w.
C(x) =
{
+1, if
∑
i wi · f(x) + b > 0
−1, otherwise (1)
The attacker has access to the features f(.) learned form
the teacher model that are transferred and used by the text
classifier C. The attackers objective is to misclassify inputs to
a specific output class. We describe these attacks below:
Misclassification or Adversarial Attacks. Misclassification
or adversarial attacks involve performing small perturbations
to any input such that the changes are unrecognizable by a
human but fools the classifier into predicting the desired output
class. Let δ be any perturbation from a set of valid perturba-
tions ∆. Valid perturbations are the feasible modifications an
attacker can make to the input under the specified threat model.
For example, adding a sentence conveying the same message
in different words is a valid perturbation as an adversary can
write any number of sentences. The goal of the adversary is
to generate an adversarial input x′ for an input x such that
min
δ
C(x′) 6= C(x) where x+ δ = x′ (2)
Similar attacks are shown on image classification mod-
els [26]. However, their techniques do not apply in text domain
because of the discrete nature of inputs. Arbitrary perturbation
might lose the semantic correctness of the text input making
it completely senseless and easily detectable. In comparison,
it is easier to modify images without being distinguished by
a human observer. Often, the perturbations are conditioned
such that the L2 distance of the modified image from the
original image is less than a threshold th to keep the noise
undetectable. Adding such unnoticeable noise is not possible
in texts, as changing a single character is easily detectable by
spellcheckers [16]. Also, changing a word in a sentence can
modify the whole semantic structure of the input. Therefore,
accounting for closeness in the semantic meaning of the input
is important than the absolute distance of characters or words.
Nevertheless, existing literature for adversarial samples in text
compute the amount of perturbation as the fraction of replaced
words and bound it using a threshold th [4], [15]. We use the
same metric and leave the task of finding a justifiable way of
defining adversarial examples for text data to future work.
D. Attack overview
Our attack strategies differ for transfer learning with word-
based and sentence-based embedding models. However, all
of them are based on the common theme of models making
predictions based on unintended features.
Unintended Features. Neural networks learn features from
the training dataset that lead to high accuracy for the validation
data but the prediction might infact use some unintended
features. Recent papers have shown that deep learning models
often make predictions based on undesirable features like race,
gender and so on [5]. Ilyas et al. show that image classification
models, while optimizing features that increase accuracy, can
learn from useful but non-robust features [13]. Presence of
non-robust features result in the models being susceptible to
adversarial perturbations. In this work, we empirically show
that text classification models make predictions based on
features that do not capture the task intended to perform by
the model. For example, while certain words like ‘Wikileaks’
and ‘Sources’ are more common in fake news than in real
news, classifying a news as fake purely based on the presence
of these words is not expected from the model. It can be
argued that if the training dataset contains this bias then maybe
it is indeed an important feature for classifying news. This
argument is true if the test dataset also follows the same
distribution of words. However, the distribution of words is
often user-dependent and therefore can be maliciously changed
under our threat model. In this paper, we present attacks that
exploit these unintended features, either transferred from the
teacher model or learned by the student model.
Attack Algorithms. Due to the difference in the training
process of teacher models, our attack strategies are based
on different features. For word-level embedding, the words
present in the input and their representation fw(wi) plays
an important role in the prediction. The attacks on sentence-
level embedding model are dependent on the output value of
the embedding representation of input x, fs(x). We exploit
this knowledge in our attack and propose novel strategies to
identify the classification boundaries for binary and multiple
tasks using the observable features from the public teacher
model. Essentially, we query the teacher model with a input
x to collect the features and query the black-box student
model with the same input to observe the output class. We
demonstrate that with limited queries to the student model
accompanied with those to the teacher model, we identify
a classification boundary in the feature space. We use this
boundary in the feature space as a proxy for the student model
and craft adversarial samples in an efficient manner. Unlike
prior work, we do not require to query the student model
during the online attack [4]. We present a concrete word-score
based attack alogrithm in Section IV, and length and sentence-
based attack in Section V.
III. WORD-LEVEL EMBEDDING ATTACK DETAILS
Word-level embedding models were first introduced by
Mikolov et al. [20]. They represent an input word in the form
of an n-dimensional real vector. The word embeddings are
the standard way of representing inputs for training natural
language models. For the explanation of our attacks in this
section, we use the GloVe embedding model as our teacher
model to train different student models. The student model
initializes its weights with the GloVe vectors and is either
fine-tuned called GloVeFT or used simply as a feature extractor
called GloVeFE. We consider student model trained for binary
and multiple classification tasks. We use the Fake News De-
tection and Newsgroup dataset divided into 6 and 20 classes as
our representatives for binary and multi-class models (details
in Section IV). However, our attack techniques are generic
and are applicable to any text-based classification task transfer
learned using any word-level embedding model.
A. Word-score based Prediction
We hypothesize that the student models that are trained
using word-level embedding teacher model predict the output
class purely based on the words present in the input sample.
This hypothesis relies on two key characteristics of language
models. First, models memorize words present in the training
dataset and use them as important features to predict the
output. Second, the importance of a word for prediction is
directly related to the frequency of that word in the training
dataset with respect to the specific output class. For example, a
common word such as “The” that appears frequently in inputs
of all the classes will not be an important feature to predict
a particular output class. These observations are in-line with
previous work [4], [15], [16] that show importance of a few
words in classification of an input. In this work, we propose
a new technique to calculate the importance or score of each
word towards the output class. Using the word-score metric,
we propose a method to identify the classification boundaries
for binary and multiple classification tasks. We validate the
accuracy of our word-score based prediction and observe it to
be close to the original ground truth values.
Word-score for Binary Tasks. Let the student model S
have two output classes A and B and the word w has the
output probabilities as pA and pB . Each word has a score K
corresponding to each class. Then, the score for w is:
o = arg max
x∈{A,B}
px (3)
Kw[o] = po − po′ (4)
Kw[o
′] = 0 (5)
where o′ represents the class other than o. Using this metric,
we calculate the score of an input sample I = w1 . . . wn by
adding the score of each word in their corresponding class.
Thus, the score K of the input I for each class j is:
KI [j] =
n∑
i=1
Kwi [j] (6)
Our word-score based prediction method assigns an input I
to a class j with the maximum score as follows.
j = arg max
x∈{A,B}
KI [x] (7)
The above method gives accurate prediction when the words
in the vocabulary are distributed evenly among the output
classes i.e, the number of positive scored words in class A
are almost equal to those in class B. Often, the distribution of
words is skewed towards a particular class. Hence, we propose
an advanced word-score prediction method that considers the
skewness in the distribution of words. Let tA be the ratio of
words with respect to all the words in the vocabulary that
belong to class A, then
j = arg max
x∈{A,B}
KI [x]
tx
(8)
Word-score for Multiple Tasks. In a multiple classification
task, the model predicts among n different output classes.
The overall method for calculating the word-score remains
the same as in binary classification except that we consider n
classes for scoring each word. We can generalize the scoring
Eq. 5 to n classes with each class having probability p1 . . . pn.
o = arg max
x∈{1,...,n}
px (9)
Kw[o] = po − 1
n− 1
n∑
i=1,i6=o
pi (10)
Kw[o
′] = 0 (11)
where o′ is for all the classes except the one with the maximum
score. The final output class is the one with the maximum sum
of word-scores compared to other classes. With the increase
in number of classes, each class receives a lower total score
and the class having the maximum neutral words or common
words becomes dominating. To make sure that the word-score
indicates the presence of words particular to a specific class,
for multi-class classifiers, we include a word score only if
it is greater than a minimum threshold of the scores. This
threshold is identified empirically after observing the word-
score for all the words in the vocabulary across all the classes.
This modified scoring strategy removes the common words
that have low scores but are present in majority, and act as
noise towards the prediction. This problem is less relevant
in binary tasks as the total sum score for each class is high
enough to not let the common words impact the classification.
B. Validating Word-score Heuristic
We evaluate how good is of our word-score heuristic on bi-
nary and multiple classification tasks for Fake News Detection
and Newsgroup dataset respectively.
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Fig. 2: Word-score based heuristics for identifying the classification boundary
for Fake News Detection classifier
Binary Tasks. We aim to validate how close or good is
the classification boundary identified using our word-score
mechanism. First, we take an input text which is rightly
classified as a fake news by our binary classifier trained for
fake news detection. Next, we replace the words with a high
fake score to words with real score in this input and query the
classifier again. Figure 2a shows the change in the difference
of log probability and word-score with the number of words
replaced in the input. The classification flips at one point
and the model predicts the sentence to be real with high
probability. This shows that there is a direct correlation with
words-score sum and the input sentence classification. The
exact correlation is identified by observing the distribution of
words between the two classes. Figure 2b shows the ratio of
KI [fake] and KI [real], across various real and fake news
inputs from the dataset. Most of the real news have a ratio of
less than 1, indicating a higher value of KI [real]. Similarly,
majority of fake samples have a ratio greater than 1. The Rw
is the ratio of the total number of fake words divided by the
total number of real words in the entire vocabulary. Thus, Rw
is a good estimate for classifying if a sample is real or fake.
We compare the output class predicted using our word-score
mechanism to the ground truth values of 2000 Real and 2000
Fake News samples. The word-scores are calculated by query-
ing the student model that is trained using both GloVeFT and
GloVeFE. Table I shows that our word-score based mechanism
Rw TP TN Avg. Acc. (%)
GloVeFT 1.1 1967 1931 97.4
GloVeFE 0.99 1698 1735 85.82
TABLE I: Accuracy of fake news detection using word-score hypothesis on
2000 real and 2000 fake news samples. TP shows the correctly classified fake
news while TN gives the result for correct classification of real news.
Categories TP TN Avg. Acc. (%)
Computer 88 100 94
Recreation 100 100 100
Science 100 98 99
Politics 100 100 100
Religion 92 100 96
rec.motorcycles 77 92 77.46
rec.sport.baseball 96 98 96.49
talk.politics.guns 52 100 52.5
talk.politics.misc 48 97 48.4
soc.religion.christian 91 88 91.44
TABLE II: Accuracy of word-score based prediction for the Newsgroup
dataset for broader (top 5) and finer classes (bottom 5) classification tasks.
Each class is evaluated for true positives and true negatives out of 200 samples
(100 of the same class and 100 from other classes).
identifies the prediction boundary with 97.4% and 85.82%
accuracy when the student model is trained with GloVeFT and
GloVeFE respectively. The student model itself reaches 95.4%
and 95.1% accuracy as shown in Section IV. This shows that
our classification boundary using word-score technique is very
close to the actual boundary of the student model. This makes
our word-score based model a good proxy for the student
model and allows us to efficiently craft adversarial samples.
Multiple Tasks. We measure the accuracy of our word-score
based heuristic for the multi-class dataset of 20Newsgroup.
The 20Newsgroup dataset is divided into 6 broader categories
and 20 finer categories [14]. For example, the ‘rec.motorcycle’
class is a part of the broader class ‘Recreation’. Table II shows
the first five rows for the broader categories and bottom five
for the finer classes. To test the word-score based prediction
accuracy for each of these classes separately, we select 200
samples out of which 100 belong to that category and the
remaining 100 from other categories. Then, the true positive
(TP) value for a class refers to the samples belonging to
that class which were correctly classified using our word-
score mechanism. Similarly, true negative (TN) refers to the
correctly classified samples that do not belong to the class.
The number of true positives and true negatives are high,
indicating that our word-score based heurisitc is effective in
the multi-class setting as well. The broader classes have higher
accuracy as compared to the finer classes. This observation
implies that it becomes difficult to perform adversarial attacks
as the number of classes increase (as shown in Section IV).
C. Shadow Word-score Model
To use our word-score based prediction mechanism, we have
to calculate the word-score for each word in the vocabulary.
This ideally requires a large number of queries proportional
to the vocabulary size (typically 50,000) to the student model.
To reduce the queries to the student model, we build a shadow
model S′ that tries to mimic the original student model S. The
initial layer of the shadow model S′ is the same as the teacher
Model / Queries 10 100 1000 10000
Random 51.9 52.2 52.5 56.6
GloVeFT 59.9 61.5 62.4 73.2
GloVeFE 67.1 78.2 89.3 95.5
TABLE III: Table comparing the accuracy of shadow model against all words
in the vocabulary of the student model for Fake News Detection. The increase
in queries implies more accuracy. Also, GloVeFE performs better than GloVeFT
as the fine-tuned weights are inaccessible to the shadow model
model T of the student model S. Our threat model assumes
the attacker knows the type of the teacher model used in the
student model. The objective of the model S′ is to learn the
weights after the initial layers initialized from T . Therefore,
we query the model S for a few words and compute the score
for these words as per Eq. 5 above. We use these words and
their score as the input dataset to train our shadow model S′ to
predict the word score for rest of the words in the vocabulary.
It should be noted that since word’s distribution follow the
Zipf’s law, the most common words constitute the majority
of the usage. Hence, we query the word-score for the most
common words from S model and use that to train the model
S′. This strategy allows us to compute the exact word-score
for most of the words that may occur in the input text and
estimate the score for others using S′.
Evaluating the Shadow Model. We aim to evaluate the
accuracy of our shadow model when trained using different
number of word-score pairs for the Fake News Detection
student model. The total number of words in the vocabulary
of the student model are 43, 348. We query all the words to
the student model to get the ground truth values. The accuracy
of the shadow model is calculated over all the words except
those used to train the model. Table III shows the accuracy
of our shadow model trained using 10, 100, 1000 and 10, 000
word-score pairs. We highlight that a limited set of queries
(100 or 1000) to the student model are sufficient to train a
reasonable shadow word-score model. Moreover, these queries
are required only once to establish the classification boundary
and no queries are required while performing the actual online
attack. Our shadow model technique distinguishes our attacks
from prior work that require unlimited queries to the victim
model [4], [15], [16]. As shown in Table III, the shadow
model has the lowest accuracy when trained using scores
from a randomly initialized student model. This is expected as
this model gains no information from the teacher model. The
GloVeFT model has lower accuracies as compared to when the
teacher model is purely used as a feature extractor GloVeFE.
This is because the shadow model does not have access to the
update embedding vector in the case of the GloVeFT model.
Note that, throughout the process of training a shadow word-
score model, we do not require access to the training dataset.
D. Creating Adversarial Samples
Our goal is to generate an adversarial example x′ such that
it is similar to the actual input x but is classified differently
from x. Without loss of generality, let us assume that x′ should
get classified to class B. To generate such an example, we
use the word-score based prediction as discussed earlier. The
Algorithm 1 Adversarial example generation for sentence s
containing w1 . . . wn from class A to B
1: Sm ← Shadow model trained using q queries
2:
3: function CHECKCONSTRAINTS(w,w′)
4: POSw ← Part of speech of w
5: POSw’ ← Part of speech of w’
6: if POSw = Adjective or POSw = Noun or POSw = Verb or POSw
= Aderb then
7: if POSw = POSw’ then
8: return true
9: end if
10: end if
11: return false
12: end function
13:
14: function GETREPLACEMENTWORD(w)
15: candidateWords ← top gw closest GloVe words
16: for w’ in candidateWords do
17: if CheckConstraints(w,w′) = false then
18: remove w’ from candidateWords
19: end if
20: end for
21: if candidateWords = None then
22: return None
23: end if
24: wr ← candidateWord with max KB based on Sm
25: if KB [w] > KB [wr] then
26: return None
27: end if
28: return wr
29: end function
30:
31: function GENERATEADVEXAMPLE(s, gw, th)
32: t =(len(replaced words)) / (len(input words))
33: targetWords ← Sort wi based on KA[wi] from Sm
34: for w in targetWords do
35: if t > th then
36: break
37: end if
38: wr ← getReplacementWord(w)
39: if wr! = None then
40: Replace w with wr
41: Update t
42: end if
43: end for
44: end function
word-score based method states that higher the sum of word
scores of class B, more likely the model will classify the input
as B. Therefore, we can search for x′ such that T (x′) is close
to T (x) but has a higher class B score.
The attack in Algorithm 1 considers the GloVe word em-
bedding as the teacher model to attack a text classification
student model initialized by GloVe vectors. A shadow model
is initially trained using q queries to the student model and
observing the output probabilities. We use the trained shadow
model thereafter, to retrieve word score for all the required
words. The adversarial example generation algorithm (function
generateAdvExample) takes two parameters along with
the original input example. First parameter is the number of
similar words considered for the attack based on the GloVe
model, gw. The second parameter is defined as the threshold th
or the maximum fraction of words allowed to be replaced by
similar words when performing the adversarial attack. When
choosing a replacement word for an input word as shown in
function getReplacementWord, we chose the word to be
among gw closest word according to the GloVe vectors with
maximum class B word score. Selecting nearby words in the
vector embedding space guarantees semantic correctness of
the generate adversarial example. While selecting the replace-
ment word, we satisfy the constraints described in function
checkConstraints. The constraint procedure makes sure
that the replacement word is among the following part-of-
speech: noun, adjective, verb or adverb and has the same part-
of-speech as the input word. This guarantees that replacing the
input word with similar words does not change the structure
of the input and hence retains its syntactic similarity. The
generateAdvExample function sorts the words in the
input sentence based on the score of Class A. Replacing high
scoring words from class A reduces the sum score of class
A significantly. If the fraction of replaced words t exceed the
specified threshold th or there are no more nearby words i.e.,
targetWords, then the algorithm terminates.
IV. WORD EMBEDDING ATTACK EVALUATION
We present a detailed evaluation of our adversarial examples
generated using attack Algorithm 1 against different types of
downstream tasks. We evaluate the attack accuracy of our
algorithm against the best-known prior works. We also analyze
our algorithm’s attack accuracy in misclassifying inputs from
a source class to a target class in a multi-class scenario.
A. Experimental Setup
Pre-trained model & Teacher model. We consider the Global
Vectors or GloVe model as our teacher model which is among
the best word representation models [23]. GloVe model is
available online and is trained on a corpus of Wikipedia data
with 6B tokens, 400K vocab, uncased, 50d, 100d, 200d, &
300d vectors. We use it with 300-dimensional vector in our
experiments.
Dataset & Downstream tasks. We consider three different
downstream tasks that incorporate both binary and multi-
class classification student models trained using GloVe teacher
model. The student model for each of these tasks is a 1-layer
LSTM with 256 hidden units followed by a linear layer trained
using a learning rate of 0.001. The three tasks are as follows:
• Fake News Detection [19]. This is a binary classification
task to classify whether news articles are real or fake. The
dataset has of 5335 training and 1000 test news reports.
• IMDB Movie Reviews [18]. The IMBD dataset contains
movie reviews with sentiment polarity labels. A review is
negative if it has a score of less than 5 out of 10, while a
positive review has a score greater than 6. IMBD dataset
consists of 25000 training and test movie reviews.
• 20 Newsgroup [14]. The 20Newsgroup dataset consists of
20 classes of newsgroups ranging from sports to politics
to religion. This dataset also has a broader classification
of documents into 6 groups. The training and test dataset
consists of 11270 and 7503 samples respectively.
Model Accuracy
Fake News Detection
GloVeFT 95.4
GloVeFE 95.1
GloVeDR 95.8
BERTFT 92.1
IMDB Movie Reviews
GloVeFT 90.3
GloVeDr 90.3
20Newsgroup
GloVeFT - 6 class 92.1
GloVeFT- 20 class 67.3
TABLE IV: Model accuracy for different model’s trained on different datasets.
GloVeFT is a fine-tuned student model , GloVeFE is a feature extractor model.
GloVeDR is same as GloVeFT with dropouts in between layers.
gw Fake News Detection IMDB Movie Reviews
Real to Fake Fake to Real +ve. to -ve -ve. to +ve
Model trained without Dropout
10 83.5 56.2 85.8 82.8
20 89.3 70.5 94.2 95.9
Model trained with Dropout
10 72.6 60.9 89.6 83.9
20 75.7 78.1 95.9 97.5
TABLE V: Attack accuracy with a perturbation threshold th of 0.2.
B. Student Model Accuracy
We train three variants of the student model with GloVe
as a feature-extractor called GloVeFE, with fine-tuning called
GloVeFT and fine-tune with dropouts GloVeDR. We report
the original model accuracy for the student models in Table
IV1. The Fake News Detection accuracy is the highest for
GloVeDR model as adding dropouts to the model makes the
model more generalization and achieves better accuracy on
the test dataset. BERT model is initialized by BERT pre-
trained vector followed by a simple feed-forward layer. We
discuss the architecture in more details in Section V. We train
the IMBD dataset with GloVeFT and GloVeDr, to compare the
results with prior best attacks, as discussed later in the section.
The model accuracy is the same with and without dropouts
because the IMDB dataset has a larger training dataset that
prevents overfitting. We also explore the multi-class setting
using the 20Newsgroup dataset. The model trained on this
dataset has a similar configuration as GloVeFT, except that the
final output layer was equal to the number of classes. We report
accuracy for 6 classes and 20 classes in the table. The model
accuracy decreases with an increase in the number of classes,
as the 20 classes are the finer categorization of the 6 classes.
Although we did not optimize our models to the state-of-the-
art classification accuracy they are close to the best-known
prediction numbers.
C. Attack Accuracy for Binary Tasks
In Table V, we present the attack accuracy on the Fake
News Detection and IMDB Movie Reviews student model
trained using GloVe model with and without dropouts. We
exclude using GloVe as a feature extractor since it achieves
the lowest validation accuracy. For generating the advesarial
1Since GloVeFT performs better than GloVeFE, we use GloVeFE in IMDB
and 20newsgroup dataset.
Model gw th Attack Accuracy
Real to Fake Fake to Real
GloVeFE
10
0.2 62.7 48.3
0.5 81.1 63.4
1 81.1 64.4
20
0.2 75.3 54.1
0.5 92.2 79.6
1 92.2 80.6
GloVeFT
10
0.2 83.5 56.2
0.5 88.8 80.2
1 88.8 81.2
20
0.2 89.3 70.5
0.5 96.2 90.3
1 96.8 91.3
TABLE VI: Table comparing the accuracy of adversarial attack against
different models. gw refers to the number of closest Glove words considered
for replacement. th refers to upper limit on fraction of words replaced.
gw\Classes Comp Rec Sci Religion Misc
100 0 99 68 51 36
200 1 100 94 87 58
300 3 100 97 93 80
Avg.t 0.09 0.37 0.31 0.26 0.31
TABLE VII: Attack accuracy on the Newsgroup for 6 classes dataset. The
target class is Politics. The last row represents average fraction of replaced
words across different classes.
examples for these tasks, we use a shadow model trained with
1000 word-score pairs queried from the student model. As
discussed in Section III, gw refers to the number of closest
words based on GloVe, that are considered for replacing the
input word. Therefore, gw is an indicator of the semantic
closeness of the adversarial examples to the original input. For
the Movie Reviews, we consider misclassification from both
positive to negative and negative to positive sentiments. We
randomly sampled 1000 positive and negative reviews from
IMDB test dataset and tried to misclassify them by generating
adversarial examples using our attack algorithm. The average
attack accuracy with gw = 20 for the movie reviews is 95%
and 96.7% without and with dropouts respectively. For the
Fake News Detection task, we consider 1000 real and 1000
fake samples and try to misclassify them to the opposite class.
The average attack accuracy for the news dataset is 80% and
76.9% without and with dropout respectively. We find that it
is easy to misclassify a real news to fake rather than fake
to real. This is because the number of fake words, as well
as the sum of fake word scores, is more than that of real
words. With more alternatives in hand, it is comparatively
easier to change real news reports to fake than the other way
around. We keep the perturbation threshold to be 0.2 i.e, at
max 20% of the words could be replaced to generate the
adversarial example. The attack accuracy is a slightly higher
in the case of movie reviews. This might be because of a
clear separation between words used to express positive and
negative sentiments, compared to fake and real news. However,
we do observe that the word “Obama” has a high score for
real news and “Wikileaks” for the fake news.
We perform a fine grained attack evaluation for the Fake
News Detection task by varying the threshold th parameter.
The threshold th is the upper bound on the fraction of words
that are allowed to be replaced. Tabel VI shows the accuracy
Category gw =100 gw =200 Avg. t
Recreation
rec.sport.hockey 22 84 0.03
rec.motorcycles 0 0 0.004
rec.autos 6 6 0.006
rec.sport. 44 94 0.05
Religion
soc.religion.christian 39 90 0.06
alt.atheism 0 4 0.05
talk.religion.misc 2 4 0.02
Science
sci.crypt 18 24 0.02
sci.space 14 42 0.03
sci.med 92 96 0.06
sci.electronics 26 30 0.04
Computer
comp.os.ms-
windows.misc 0 0 0.01
comp.windows.x 0 2 0.03
comp.sys.ibm.
pc.hardware 0 0 0.005
comp.graphics 0 16 0.04
comp.sys.
mac.hardware 0 0 0
Misc misc.forsale 74 96 0.06
Politics
talk.politics.
midwest 98 100 0.04
talk.politics.guns 16 84 0.03
TABLE VIII: Attack accuracy in converting ‘talk.politics.misc’ to different
classes. Avg. t is the fraction of replaced words in the input for each category.
for misclassifying both real and fake news with th values
of 0.2, 0.5 and 1. As expected, an increase in the value of
th and gw indicates an increase in attack accuracy. However,
the attack accuracy gets saturated when there are not enough
candidate words due to stringent semantic gw and replacement
th threshold. In most cases, increasing the threshold value
from 0.5 to 1, doesn’t increase the accuracy as there are not
enough semantically similar words from GloVe that satisfy the
constraint mentioned in Algorithm 1.
D. Multi-class Classification
We analyze the effect of increasing classes on the efficacy
of our attack algorithm using the word-score based prediction.
Prior works have not shown adversarial examples for multiple
classification task with the exception of Liang et al. [17].
However, they do not perform a comprehensive study and
limit their evaluation to only 23 selected examples from
different classes and change it to a randomly selected class.
In contrast, we perform an exhaustive evaluation using the
20Newsgroup dataset. To understand the impact of increase
in the output classes, we divide the dataset into 6 and 20
classes. The 6 classes consist of ‘Computer’, ‘Recreation’,
‘Science’, ‘Miscellaneous’, ‘Politics’ and ‘Religion’. The 20
classes comprise of finer divisions of each of the 6 classes.
For example, ‘Politics’ is divided into ‘talk.politics.misc’,
‘talk.politics.guns’ and ‘talk.politics.mideast’. All our adver-
sarial examples are generated using a shadow model trained
with only 1000 queries to the student model.
In Table VII, we show the attack accuracy for misclassifying
100 test documents from Politics to the 5 other classes
mentioned in the table. We achieve an average attack accuracy
of 75% for our targeted misclassification attacks. We can
misclassify documents from politics to recreation with almost
100% accuracy. This is because of the presence of a large
number of candidate replacement words. However, the attack
Method Threat Model Queries Targeted/untargeted Model Success rate
Word-Score (This paper) Grey-box Restricted Targeted LSTM 96.7%
Alzantot et al. [4] Black Unlimited Targeted LSTM 97%
iAdv-Text [25] White Unlimited Non-targeted LSTM 93.92%
TextBugger [16] White Unlimited Non-targeted char-CNN 86.7%
Samanta et al. [24] White Unlimited Non-targeted CNN 67.45%
Gong et al. [9] White Unlimited Targeted CNN 86.66%
TABLE IX: Comparing our method, Word-score approach, to the best-known previous attack in literature on IMBD Movie Review dataset.
Model Prediction,Confidence(-ve,+ve) Text
Original NEG,(0.99,0.01)
“This movie had terrible acting, terrible plot, and terrible choice of actors.
(Leslie Nielsen ...come on!!!) the one part I considered slightly funny was the battling FBI/CIA agents,
but because the audience was mainly kids they didnt understand that theme”
Word-Score(Our) POS,(0.1,0.9)
“This movie had unspeakable directing, unspeakable assassination, and unspeakable choice of characters.
(Leslie Nielsen ...come on!!!) the one part I considered moderately funny was the battling FBI/CIA agents,
but because the audience was mainly kids they didnt understand that theme”
Alzantot [4] POS,(0.2,0.8)
“This movie had horrific acting, horrific plot, and textbfhorrifying choice of actors.
(Leslie Nielsen ...come on!!!) the one part I regarded slightly funny was the battling FBI/CIA agents, but
because the audience was mainly youngsters they didnt understand that theme.”
Original NEG,(0.96,0.04)
“I watched this movie recently mainly because I am a Huge fan of Jodie Foster’s. I saw this movie was made
right between her 2 Oscar award winning performances, so my expectations were fairly high. Unfortunately,
I thought the movie was terrible and I’m still left wondering how she was ever persuaded to make this movie.
The script is really weak.”
Word-Score(Our) POS,(0.3,0.7)
“I watched this movie recently mainly because I am a enormous fan of Jodie Foster’s. I saw this movie was
made right between her 2 Oscar award winning performances, so my expectations were fairly high. Really,
I thought the movie was horrible and I’m still left wondering how she was ever persuaded to make this movie.
The screenplay is really sluggish.”
TextBugger [16] POS,(0.4,0.6)
“I watched this movie recently mainly because I am a Huge fan of Jodie Foster’s. I saw this movie was made
right between her 2 Oscar award winning performances, so my expectations were fairly high. Unf0rtunately,
I thought the movie was terrib1e and I’m still left wondering how she was ever persuaded to make this movie.
The script is really wea k.”
Original NEG,(0.97,0.03)
“A sprawling, overambitious, plotless comedy that has no dramatic center. It was probably intended to have an
epic vision and a surrealistic flair (at least in some episodes), but the separate stories are never elevated into a
meaningful whole, and the laughs are few and far between. Amusing ending, though. (*1/2)”
Word-Score(Our) POS,(0.1,0.9)
“A sprawling, overambitious, balanchine comedy that has no remarkable center. It was probably designed to have
an epic vision and a impressionistic flair (at least in some episodes), but the separate tales are never elevated into a
meaningful whole, and the laughs are several and far between. Amusing ending, though. (*1/2)”
Samanta [24] NEG,(0.97,0.03)
“A sprawling, overambitious, plotless funny that has no dramatic center. It was probably intended to have an epic
vision and a surrealistic fair (at least in some episodes), but the separate stories are never elevated into a greatly meaningful
whole, and the laughs are little and far between. Amusing ending, though. (*1/2)”
TextFool [17] NEG,(0.99,0.01)
“A sprawling, overambitious, plotless horrorible that has no dramatic center. It was probably intended to have an fail
vision and a surrealistic fair (at least in some episodes), but the separate stories are never elevated into a false meaningful whole,
and the laughs are few and far between. Amusing ending, though. (*1/2)”
TABLE X: Examples of adversarial samples crafted from IMDB Movie Reviews dataset using our algorithm and some of the prior best works
accuracy for converting politics to the computer category is
the lowest, which is expected as there are not enough similar
words for high scoring political words that have a significant
score in computer class. The average fraction of replaced
words is less than 0.09 for this case. For other categories,
the average fraction is around 0.3 which indicates that fewer
words are perturbed to perform the misclassification. Similar
to binary classification, we observe that increasing the value
of gw, increases the number of potential replacement words,
leading to an increase in the attack accuracy. This shows that
it is easier to convert to classes that share similar vocabulary,
compared to classes with different word distribution.
Table VIII shows the attack accuracy for converting
‘talk.politics.misc’ to the other 19 classes. Similar to Table
VII, the attack accuracy is lowest for classes falling under
the computer category. Also, changing to other sub-classes
within the politics category has a higher success rate compared
to other classes, since they share a common vocabulary.
With the increase in the number of classes, the number of
potential replacement words decrease resulting in smaller t
values (last column). Also, increasing the value of gw leads
to higher attack accuracy similar to the previous table. It is
interesting to note that there is a jump in attack accuracy for
the Misc group compared to Table VII, although the accuracy
remains similar for other classes. This is because the inputs
in ‘talk.politics.misc’ are more similar to the Misc group
than the whole Politics category in general. Thus, although
misclassifcation accuracy for some individual classes is high
such as 98% for “talk.politics.midwest”, the average attack
accuracy is only 41%.
E. Comparison to Previous Work
In Table IX, we compare our attack accuracy to best-
known attacks for generating adversarial examples for non-
tranfer learned Movie Reviews classifier, as reported in a
recent survey paper by Wang et al. [29]. The threat model
column in Table IX captures the difference in the assumption
about the adversarial setting. Our attack is very close to the
best-known attack accuracy by Alzantot et al. [4]. Alzantot et
al. consider a black-box setting but assume unlimited queries
to the black-box model. We highlight that ours is the only
attack that works with limited queries to the victim model
because of the grey-box threat model that is enabled with
transfer learning. Our attack algorithm is efficient with only
7 sec required for generating an example as compared to
43 sec by Alzantot et al [4]. This is an artifact of our
systematic approach of generating adversarial examples on text
as compared to randomly trying different words. Our attack
outperforms all other prior work in the white-box setting. This
indicates that the transfer learning setting indeed increases
the susceptibility towards adversarial attacks for text-based
classification models.
Finally, we take adversarial examples from some of these
prior works and show how they compare against our examples
in Table X. We report the confidence value of our student
model in column 2. The adversarial examples by TextBugger
use spelling error and spaces between words, which can be
detected by spell check [16]. Adversarial examples by Samanta
et al. [24] and TextFool [17] did not get misclassified on our
model. Lastly, the example by Alzantot et al. [4] is similar to
the adversarial example generated by our attack.
V. SENTENCE EMBEDDING ATTACKS
In this section, we explore attacks on student models
trained using sentence-level embedding models. These models
represent the input sentence into an n-dimensional vector
that captures the context of the entire input. For generating
adversarial examples on these models, we take into account
some other unintended features that the model learns, for
e.g., the length of the input or how it memorizes sentences.
We initially show how our hypothesis is correct by showing
the presence of these biases in the training dataset or in the
teacher model and then describe the attack algorithm. We
show the efficacy of these attacks on state-of-the-art BERT
model implying that even these models are not robust against
misclassification attacks.
Teacher Model: Bert-Base. BERT, stands for Bidirectional
Encoder Representations from Transformers, which is a sen-
tence level embedding vector representation developed by
Google. BERT achieves state-of-the-art performance on a
large number of sentence and word level tasks, outperforming
previous task-specific architectures. Unlike word-level embed-
ding model which are context-free, BERT is a bi-directional
contextual representation. That means, while representing a
word w2 in a sentence w1w2w3, BERT not only take the
previous words w1 into consideration but also w3. BERT
models have tens of layers and millions of parameters. The
BERT model took 4 days to train on 4 to 16 Cloud TPUs [6].
Fine-tuning of BERT model is relatively cheaper and takes a
few hours to train on GPU. We use the BERT model, “bert-
base-uncased” that has 12-layer, 768-hidden, 12-heads, 110M
parameters. We train our student model for classification of
real-fake news on top of this pre-trained model.
Student model. We train the Fake News Detection binary task
using the BERTFT as the teacher model. The student model
has the initial layers of “bert-base-uncased” model, which
is connected to a simple feed-forward layer that outputs the
prediction. We fine-tune the BERT model with a learning rate
of 0.000001 and a learning rate of 0.001 for the final feed-
forward layer. The student model accuracy is 92.1%.
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Fig. 3: Comparing fraction of training real and fake samples having length
less than x.
Identifying unintendedn features. We observe that the BERT
pre-trained model is robust against the word-score based
attack. This is expected as the BERT model takes the whole
sentence as input and output vectors representations based
on its context. However, the model is susceptible to other
unintended features. We identify two unintended features,
length, and sentence-based features, in the model and use
it to generate adversarial examples. These two methods are
discussed in detail in the following subsections.
A. Length-based Adversarial Examples
The length-based adversarial examples take advantage of
the fact that the model is making predictions based on an
unintended feature - the length of the input. The BERT pre-
trained captures the length of the sentence in the vector repre-
sentation, which is then used as a feature in the classification
task. However, the length of the input is invariant in the task
of real and fake news classification. A fake news report can
consist of any number of sentences. However, we will show
that this feature is present in the training input distribution.
Evaluation Methodology. In Figure 3, we show that the
number of fake samples in the training dataset with length less
than 512 is almost double of that of real samples. We consider
the length limit of 512, as BERT model can take a maximum
input length of 512. Of all the training samples, 72% of real
samples had a length of 512, while only 45% of fake samples
had a length of 512. This introduces an unintended useful
feature, which is the length of the input. The student model
uses this feature to classify news reports into fake and real.
We can, therefore, generate adversarial examples by reducing
the length of real news articles to misclassify them as fake.
Attack Results. We develop a simple adversarial attack to
exploit the feature that the model is making classifications
based on the length of the input. We take 100 real and fake
samples and reduce the number of input sentences. Reducing
the number of sentences in a report should not affect the
classification of the input. In Figure 4, attack accuracy for
unmodified real and fake samples is around 90%, which is
also close to the model accuracy. However, as we decrease
the length of the input, the model accuracy corresponding to
real samples reduces to 12%. On the other hand, the accuracy
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Fig. 4: Comparing the change in model accuracy with different input length.
We show that decreasing the number of sentences in the input increases the
probability of being classified as fake for both real and fake samples.
of fake samples increases to 100% by decreasing the number
of sentences. This is expected as the model learns from the
training set distribution that smaller length input has more
probability of being fake news than real news.
B. Sentenced-based Adversarial Examples
This adversarial attack is based on the model memorizing
sentences from the inputs. The BERT model outputs an n-
dimensional vector representation for a sentence, which is
the input to the linear classification layer. Thus, the main
classification is based on the output of the BERT model.
During the training process, we retrain the BERT layer with
very low training rate (0.000001) and therefore even though an
adversary does not have access to the BERT layer in student
model, the output of the BERT layer in the student model
should be very similar to the output of the pre-trained BERT
model. As the classification is based on the output of BERT,
adding sentences that make the vector representation of BERT
closer to the vector representation of some real sample, should
also change the prediction of the student model towards real.
Method. We take a real and a fake news report that has been
classified by the student model correctly with high confidence.
Let the vector representation from the BERT model of the real
report be vr and of the fake news report be vf . The goal is to
generate fake samples that are closer to vr and vice-versa.
Since the student model classification is dependent on the
BERT representation, the student model will then misclassify a
fake sample as real. To show that this hypothesis is indeed true,
we take 100 real samples and 100 fake samples and calculate
their dot product with vr and vf . 76% real samples were closer
to vr compared to vf and 78% fake samples were closer to
vf compared to vr. Thus, we generate adversarial samples that
have fake content but vector representation close to vr.
Results. The adversarial attack setting is to misclassify 100
fake news samples to real by trying to move the dot product
closer to that of a real sample. We achieve this by adding
one sentence at a time from the real sample to each of the
test fake samples. Since the maximum length of inputs is 512,
we consider fake samples that have a length of less than 200.
This ensures that the maximum length does not exceed 512.
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Fig. 5: Comparing the change in model accuracy with different input length.
This graph shows that moving the BERT representation of the fake samples
closer towards the BERT representation of a known real sample, increases the
chance of get classified as real.
As seen in Figure 5, adding sentences from a real sample
moves the average dot product closer to that of the real sample.
Simultaneously, the accuracy of the model decreases from
100 to 61. The slope of the line representing the average dot
product of the samples and the accuracy are complementary to
each other. As the dot product increases significantly between
5 and 10, so does the accuracy drops massively.
VI. DEFENSES
We explore the effectiveness of our attacks on some of the
potential defenses. We select three of the common defenses
from the literature against adversarial attack, which applies to
our transfer-learning setting.
A. Fine-tuning all layers
Recently, transfer learned models have been shown to be
susceptible to different adversarial and poisoning in images
[26], [30]. Their transfer learning approach assumes that initial
k layers are kept frozen and used purely as feature extractors.
One of the obvious defense against attacks exploiting transfer-
learned features is to retrain the initial layers with the goal to
erase the memorized features in the teacher model. However,
this has shown to decrease the accuracy since the high capacity
memorization of features in these teacher model is one of the
main reasons for improved accuracy in the student model.
In our attacks against word-based embedding models, we
fine-tune the GloVe embedding layer with the same learning
rate as the student model. However, fine-tuning does not help
in mitigating these attacks as our adversarial examples do not
rely on GloVe vectors but the fact that the student model
uses certain words as important features. Table IV gives the
attack accuracy for both the GloVeFE and GloVeFT. However,
our sentence based adversarial attack is based on the BERT
output vector. Hence, retraining the initial layers make the
attack difficult to succeed as the output of the BERT layer
changes as compared to the public pre-trained model. When
we fine-tune the BERT model with a higher learning rate of
0.001 for the Fake News Detection task, we observe that fine-
tuning drops the accuracy of the student model i.e., it reduces
from 92% to 70%. This observation is in alignment with the
results from prior work [30].
B. Dropout
Dropouts in deep learning model serve the purpose of
making the model more generalizable. This makes sure that
the model is not overfitted to the training data set. Therefore,
dropouts are shown to be good at preventing the model from
memorizing the training dataset [27]. We introduce a dropout
ratio of 0.5 inside and after the LSTM layer in our binary
classification tasks making it generalizable and achieving
better test accuracy. Results in Section IV show that after
adding dropouts the attack accuracy improves. Dropouts do not
mitigate our attacks since they do not rely on the over-fitting
of the model. Our attacks leverage any unintended feature that
the model learns for prediction of the task while dropouts do
not ensure unwanted learning. However, increasing the dropout
ratio may prevent the model from making predictions based
on words but will reduce the test accuracy as the model does
not learn the right features to make correct predictions.
C. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training refers to the process of adding adver-
sarial examples to the training dataset. This makes the model
robust against those adversarial examples. Such behavior is
expected as the model now learns that these features are not
intended for the given classification task. However, the models
still remain vulnerable to other adversarial examples that are
generated using some other unintended features that the model
learns for prediction. Alzantot et al. perform a similar attack
to ours using word-based features for generating adversarial
samples albeit using a different attack strategy [4]. Their attack
algorithm is 100% robust towards adversarial training. This
is because their algorithm finds some other words that are
vulnerable and not included in the training dataset. Our word-
score based attack creates adversarial examples using words
with highest word-score. Making the model robust against a
few words does not prevent the algorithm from selecting other
words as unintended features for prediction. Thus, adversarial
training is not a robust defense against our attack.
VII. DISCUSSION
Our attacks exploit the fact that models do not always learn
and use intended features to predict the output. Our adversarial
examples are successful mainly due to the vulnerability of the
target models to unintended features. The basic idea of transfer
learning is to learn from a model trained on large data set
and thereby contains various unintended features by design.
This makes transfer-learned models more susceptible to these
attacks exacerbated by the fact that an attacker has access
to these public features. This raises the question: whether we
should use a transfer-learned model to achieve better accuracy
at the expense of security risk?
Moreover, existing defenses are not robust enough to pre-
vent these attacks without compromising model accuracy. Our
results stress on the importance of making text classification
models robust against malicious inputs. While data augmen-
tation based solutions like adversarial training have shown
to reduce the attack accuracy, adding all valid perturbations
without reducing the model accuracy is an open question.
Another approach is to make the loss function objective robust
against perturbations as well instead of just optimizing the
accuracy. All these above solutions raise the question of
properly specifying valid perturbations for a given model.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Transfer learning is shown to be effective in different do-
mains. Yosinski et al. [31] compared various transfer learning
approaches and examined their impact on model performance
for images. Transfer learning techniques were also shown to be
beneficial in improving accuracy on text classification models
and reducing the training time [11]. But the question is: Is
transfer learning from public teacher model a good decision?
Not much research has been done to understand the limitations
of using public models for transfer learning.
Attacks on transfer learning for images. Shafahi et al. [26]
were the first to propose attacks in transfer-learned models.
They showed how to poison a student model, by crafting
poisoned training datasets based on features of the teacher
model. Recently, Wang et al. and Yao et al. demonstrated
adversarial examples and latent backdoor attacks on transfer
learned image recognition models [28], [30]. However, these
few attacks that exploit the public teacher model only consider
image-based inputs. For text data, there has been work on
adversarial attacks only on the non-transfer learned setting.
Attacks on Non-transfer Learned Text Models. Papernot
el al. [21] first explored generating adversarial attacks for
text data based on fast gradient sign method (FGSM). Prior
work on generating adversarial text mostly proposed various
heuristics to optimize the objective function by replacing few
words or characters with similar alternatives that result in
misclassification of the input. The focus was on identifying the
important features (mostly words) that led to the classification
decision and then trying to replace it with some other feature
that classifies the input differently. Some common approaches
to identify the important words are removing the word from
the sentence and checking the difference in confidence [15] or
replacing it white spaces [8]. The white-box based methods
identified important words using gradient-based approach like
FGSM assuming they have access to model weights [15],
[25], [9], [24]. The important words are replaced to unknown
words by introducing a spelling error [17], [16] or replacing
them by synonyms [4], [15]. Both these techniques are based
on trial and error and do not guarantee that the input will
get misclassified. Moreover, they require several tries i.e.,
proportional to the number of words in the input to perform the
attack successfully for every input. Our adversarial examples
are robust against common defenses like trivial spell checkers
and required limited queries to the student model.
IX. CONCLUSION
We present the first attack algorithms for generating adver-
sarial inputs for text-classification tasks in a transfer-learning
setting. We perform attacks for two types of teacher models:
word-level and sentence-level based text embedding models.
We consider the word-based model, where we exploit the fact
that the model is biased to the presence of certain words
for certain classes. We also perform the first attack against
sentence-based embedding (BERT) using unintended features
like the length of sentence. We demonstrate that traditional
defenses are ineffective against our attack. Mitigating our
attacks require techniques that prevent the model from using
unintended features for prediction. However, we speculate that
enforcing such constraints might degrade the accuracy of the
model which is not acceptable in practice.
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